How Did the Zodiac Roles Module Allow the Transfer?
The transaction passed through Zodiac’s Roles Modifier, a smart contract module that allows Safe wallet owners to delegate specific transaction permissions to other addresses without requiring fresh multisignature approval for every action.Johannes Moormann, Zodiac’s co-founder, said the team reviewed the transaction and determined that the module checked the requested action against the wallet’s configured permissions before allowing it to proceed.Zodiac’s assessment identified a likely compromised key belonging to a long-standing role member. The wallet’s custom permissions policy authorized the transaction, although the developers believe that authorization was probably unintended.The distinction is important because the available evidence does not establish that an attacker bypassed the module’s security checks. Instead, the suspected attacker appears to have used an authorized transaction route whose restrictions failed to prevent the transfer.Zodiac said the affected wallet’s operators controlled its keys and permissions. The developer had neither access to those credentials nor responsibility for configuring the wallet’s transaction policy.The team has not disclosed how the role member’s key may have been compromised or which permission condition permitted the transfer.
Investor Takeaway
Where Did the $6.45 Million Go?
Bitquery traced the suspicious transaction to approximately 11:35 UTC on November 16. Its investigation found that the Safe withdrew 4.39 million USDC from a Morpho lending vault and transferred those funds, together with 1.72 million syrupUSDC tokens associated with Maple, to another wallet.The estimated $6.45 million loss represents the reported valuation of the affected assets. The token quantities should not be treated as equivalent dollar amounts because syrupUSDC is a yield-bearing token.After receiving the assets, the destination wallet converted funds through the Bitget Wallet router and forwarded approximately 3 million USDC to another address.Bitquery subsequently traced transfers through five additional wallets to Hyperliquid, where the associated accounts purchased approximately 1,947.58 XMR1 tokens for a combined $1.01 million.Four of the identified wallets received 100 ETH each, while the fifth received 160 ETH. The funds were routed through LI.FI before the corresponding Hyperliquid purchases.PeckShield had earlier reported approximately $813,000 in Monero-linked purchases. The figures reflect different observations and should not be added together as separate amounts stolen.Neither the wallet owner nor the investigators have announced a confirmed recovery or reimbursement. The identity of the affected wallet operator remains undisclosed.
Investor Takeaway
Is the Safe Wallet Incident Connected to the Lighter Attack?
Bitquery identified similarities between the Safe wallet transfers and another security incident involving decentralized derivatives exchange Lighter on the same day.In the Lighter case, investigators traced a withdrawal of approximately 10.39 million USDC from the exchange’s Ethereum settlement contract. The funds were converted to ETH, distributed among multiple wallets and partly used to purchase XMR1 on Hyperliquid.The Safe wallet funds followed a comparable route, including transfers through LI.FI and purchases of the same token. One of the Safe-related transfers also matched the 160 ETH amount observed in the Lighter investigation.However, Bitquery found no direct transfers connecting the two wallet groups. The Safe funds originated from a different source, and the evidence does not establish that the same attacker controlled both operations.A similar movement of funds occurred following the November 14 Kava Lend exploit, where Bitquery traced approximately $1.17 million into XMR1 purchases on Hyperliquid. Matching transfer methods across incidents are insufficient to establish common ownership or coordination.
What Does the Incident Mean for Institutional Wallet Security?
The suspected theft follows earlier incidents in which compromised credentials or transaction infrastructure exposed digital assets without necessarily exploiting the underlying custody contracts.In May, Polymarket investigated a $660,000 outflow involving infrastructure connected to its UMA adapter. Preliminary findings pointed to a possible private-key compromise rather than a vulnerability in the platform’s core contracts.The February 2025 Bybit breach involved a different mechanism. Attackers compromised infrastructure associated with Safe’s transaction interface and redirected approximately $1.5 billion. Subsequent legal proceedings over the Bybit theft illustrated the difficulties of tracing and recovering assets after unauthorized transfers.The latest case concerns delegated wallet permissions rather than a demonstrated interface compromise. It also does not establish a vulnerability affecting other users of Zodiac’s Roles Modifier.For institutional custodians and decentralized organizations, the incident makes the scope of delegated authority particularly relevant. Transaction limits, permitted contract functions, destination restrictions and periodic reviews of active roles can determine how much value a compromised key can access.
